This paper will discuss the costs and benefits of sharing responsibility between states and international organizations for their own internationally wrongful acts. Rules on shared responsibility are sparse in the existing law of international responsibility as codified by the International Law Commission (ILC). The emphasis of the law of international responsibility lies on exclusive responsibility and, as discussed in chapter 2 of this paper, on the attribution of wrongfulness to states and international organizations, strong reasons speak in favor of emphasizing the independence of the responsible actors. By distinguishing wrongfulness from responsibility, however, it will be argued in chapter 3 that independent wrongful acts will not necessarily lead to exclusive responsibility. A number of recent cases have illustrated that shared responsibility is a frequent outcome of the cooperation between states and international organizations. Nonetheless, such shared responsibility seems to come with more costs than benefits.
states and international organizations, strong reasons speak in favor of emphasizing the independence of the responsible actors. By distinguishing wrongfulness from responsibility, however, it will be argued in chapter 3 that independent wrongful acts will not necessarily lead to exclusive responsibility. A number of recent cases have illustrated that shared responsibility is a frequent outcome of the cooperation between states and international organizations. Nonetheless, such shared responsibility seems to come with more costs than benefits.
Injured parties, in particular, are often left without a remedy when potential wrongdoers shift the buck of responsibility between them. In order to reduce the costs caused by shared responsibility of states and international organizations, this paper therefore advocates for the recognition of a principle of joint and several responsibility in international law, which would allow for the balancing of the different interests of injured and responsible parties.
Introduction
Shared responsibility for climate change, shared responsibility for failure to intervene in countries whose populations suffers from massive human rights violations, or shared responsibility for refugee flows. 1 These examples illustrate that shared responsibility is an important topic in international law that has received more and more attention over the past years. The reasons for this increase in situations of shared responsibility in international law are manifold
and cannot be discussed in detail here. Instead of discussing the possibility of piercing the corporate veil of an international organization, this paper will focus on shared responsibility between states and international organizations for their own internationally wrongful acts.
Of course, shared responsibility is also a notoriously challenging topic because rules on shared responsibility are sparse in the existing law of international responsibility as codified by the International Law Commission (ILC). The emphasis of the law of international responsibility lies on exclusive responsibility and, as discussed in Section 2 of this paper on the attribution of wrongfulness to states and international organizations, strong reasons speak in favor of emphasizing the independence of responsible parties. By distinguishing wrongfulness from responsibility, however, it will be argued in Section 3 that independent wrongful acts will not necessarily lead to exclusive responsibility. A number of recent cases have illustrated that shared responsibility is a frequent outcome of the cooperation between states and international organizations.
Nonetheless, such shared responsibility seems to come with more costs than benefits. Injured parties, in particular, are often left without a remedy when potential wrongdoers shift the buck of responsibility. In order to reduce the costs caused by shared responsibility of states and international organizations, this paper therefore advocates for the recognition of a principle of joint and several responsibility in international law, which would allow for the balancing of the different interests of injured and responsible parties.
Attributing Wrongfulness to States and International Organizations
Responsibility is usually based on wrongful conduct, or wrongfulness, and the law on international responsibility is no exception in this regard. remained unclear how attribution of conduct and the breach of an international obligations are linked in the process of determining international responsibility.
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Section 2 will explain that the relationship between attribution and breach is decisive for understanding the prevalence of the principle of exclusive responsibility in international law, which has made it difficult to accommodate notions of shared responsibility. It will be submitted that the principle of exclusive responsibility is essentially due to the essentially independent nature of the attribution of conduct. Attribution essentially serves as a tool to connect conduct with an acting legal person, thus making corporate legal personality effective for purposes of international law (1). While the attribution of conduct thus underlines the autonomous existence of the international organization, it does not exclude that one of the same conduct is also attributed to another subject of international law. Despite this multiple attribution of conduct, the result will still be independent wrongful acts -and not to the same internationally wrongful act -since obligations are owed individually (2).
Attribution as a Means to Connect Personality and (Wrongful) Conduct
In international legal scholarship, the attribution of conduct is frequently associated with wrongful conduct. However, the role of attribution of conduct is not confined to the law of international responsibility. Notwithstanding the uses of the concept of agency in other disciplines, 13 agency in law could be defined as a "consensual relationship in which one (the agent) holds in trust for and subject to the control of another (the principal) a power to affect certain legal relations of that other". 14 Agency presupposes that an agent acts on behalf of a principal (the effects of the acts of the agent directly extend to the principal) who remains in control of the agent's acts. 15 The concept of control thereby refers to consent by the principal given to the acts, including his power of revoking, diminishing and enlarging the powers granted to the agent, and is one of the foremost reasons for responsibility of the principal.
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Although the rules on the attribution of conduct are generally not portrayed in terms of agency, they are reminiscent of the pertinent domestic law rules on agency in many ways. 17 In the ILC model of international responsibility, for instance, the rules on the attribution of conduct are clearly based on different 21 In this regard, the most important criterion for legal personality is the existence of an organ with a distinct will that is separate from its constituent parts.
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the respective approach in detail. In view of the foregoing discussion, however, it must be recognized that the attribution of the international legal personality to an international organization is not entirely in the discretion of its member states. It is primarily third parties that attribute conduct to the international organization and not to other legal persons, in particular not to its member states. 23 Such third parties may include court and tribunals dealing with wrongful acts by the international organization, but also other states or subjects of international law that conclude treaties or enter into diplomatic relations with the international organization. 
Multiple Attribution of (Wrongful) Conduct to States and International Organizations
While the independent attribution of conduct is crucial in establishing legal personality of corporate entities, it seems to be difficult to reconcile with the attribution of the idea that the same conduct can be attributed to different actors. In its recent work on the responsibility of international organizations, the ILC has become more amenable to the concept of multiple attribution of conduct "although it may not occur frequently in practice". 34 Higgins explains that this rare application has two reasons: first, the difficulties in deciding when states are involved in a dispute or not; and second, the deliberate labeling of disputes as "situations" or issues under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to avoid the application of the provision. Higgins, supra note 33, at 1-2. 35 ILC Report, Sixty-Third Session, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011), 50-170, at 81 (para. 4).
be that states are bound by the same obligation and by breaching it may commit the same internationally wrongful act (at the same time) but independently.
Allocating Responsibility between States and International Organizations
The law of international responsibility has a strong bias towards exclusive responsibility. Article 1 stipulates that "[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State", which has been interpreted as the responsibility of that state for its own conduct. 36 As one of the conditions of the internationally wrongful act, the independent attribution of conduct supports this bias towards exclusive responsibility, which makes it difficult to accommodate notions/concepts of shared responsibility. 37 Arguably, even the rules on the responsibility of a state/international organization in connection with the act of another state/international organization could be construed in terms of independent attribution of conduct. 38 However, while the internationally wrongful act -or wrongfulness -is necessarily an independent phenomenon, the same conclusion cannot be drawn with regard to responsibility.
As noted by way of introduction, responsibility frequently involved multiple actors, leading to so-called shared responsibility.
Therefore, it is suggested here to distinguish wrongfulness from responsibility.
Although often equated with wrongfulness, responsibility is a distinct concept.
Indeed, the ILC defines responsibility as the "new legal relations arising by reason of the internationally wrongful act" between the responsible and the injured parties. 39 Responsibility is thus not the internationally wrongful act, but the consequence or result of the internationally wrongful act, in particular the 36 See Nollkaemper and Jacobs, supra note 1, at 381. 37 Ibid., at 381ff. 38 A discussion of these rules is beyond the scope of this paper. 40 The decision to dismiss damage as a ground for international responsibility was related to the politicized attempts to codify rules on the treatment of aliens under Special-Rapporteur Garcia-Amador, but has since been celebrated as a "revolution" in the law of international responsibility.
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Responsibility is objective and does not depend on the subjective invocation by the injured party anymore. Whether or not damage is required to establish responsibility is left to the primary rules and not the secondary rules on responsibility.
Leaving aside the problems with the distinction between primary and secondary rules, 42 the following discussion challenges the dismissal of damage as a ground for international responsibility with specific regard to shared responsibility between member states and international organizations. 43 It will be discussed how several independently wrongful acts may result in shared responsibility.
Accordingly, independent wrongfulness on the part of different actors does not necessarily lead to exclusive responsibility. For this purpose, it is firstly necessary to understand how damage is connected with wrongful conduct. It is argued that this connection is typically established by means of causation: The internationally wrongful act causes damage, giving rise to responsibility or the duty to repair (1). Unlike wrongfulness, responsibility thereby shifts the focus to 40 For a discussion see Stern, supra note 10, at 220f. 41 According to Pellet, 'Ago's revolution' is most evident in the injured party to which this duty is owed. In some situations, several internationally wrongful acts by states and international organizations may cause the same damage to one or more injured parties. However, it is only in a situation in which this damage is indivisible that we can possibly speak of shared responsibility strictu sensu. From the perspective of the injured party, shared responsibility strictu sensu poses substantial challenges to the allocation of international responsibility between different actors (2). 44 In situations of indivisible damage, it is therefore suggested that the principle of joint and several responsibility may be useful to allocate responsibility appropriately.
Causation as a Means to Translate Wrongful Conduct into Damage
Across legal systems, causation plays a crucial role in establishing responsibility. 45 This crucial role of causation is particularly accentuated when responsibility is understood as the duty to repair damage that results from wrongful conduct. In this context, the wrongdoer is only responsible if and to the extent that he or she has caused the damage. Causation thus functions as a connecting operation between wrongful conduct and damage that justifies the imposition of a duty to repair, i.e. responsibility. While it is controversial whether or not responsibility has a reparative or corrective element across different areas of law, 46 international responsibility is still generally understood as the duty to repair damage. 47 Accordingly, it is not surprising that causation serves to establish the "customary requirement of a sufficient link between 44 The term 'shared responsibility strictu sensu' to describe responsibility for indivisible damage is borrowed from Nollkaemper and Jacobs, supra note 1, at 367. 45 In fact, it has been dubbed to be "a universal mechanism by which the law, as a philosophy and science, determines accountability". connected with an outcome. Both attribution and causation thereby rely on the available facts but are ultimately normative connecting operations because they assess these facts against the background of legal rules and principles. The applicable standard of attribution or causation thereby depends on the substantive rule of law in question. 53 In other words, the standards of attribution and causation are rule-specific, which is not to say that different areas of law do not use similar standards of attribution and causation. These standards help to determine whether or not event can be connected with outcome. All in all, the terms attribution and causation can be -and have been -used interchangeably in practice. It is quite common to speak of the attribution of damage to an actor or, in turn, the causation of wrongful conduct by an event.
54 Nonetheless, problems arise when causation and attribution are used interchangeably, leading to the omission of one operation in lieu of the other.
Considering the general importance of attribution of conduct for the establishment of corporate legal personality, it is often causation that is neglected or omitted in the law of international responsibility. 55 For this reason, it must be emphasized that attribution and causation take place at different stages in the process of establishing international responsibility and that they fulfill different purposes. The attribution of conduct is concerned with connecting the act of an agent with the principal. The process of the attribution of conduct seeks to establish whether a principal had sufficient control over his agent's actions or omissions to commit an internationally wrongful act. In contrast, causation deals with the question whether that wrongful conduct caused a legally proscribed 53 See ASR Commentary, at 39 (para. 4), explaining "In this respect there is often a close link between the basis of attribution and the particular obligation said to have been breached, even though the two elements are analytically distinct." And Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (2003), 141: "Thus, the content of the obligation breached by the relevant conduct defines the nature of the relevant causal connection between that conduct and the outcome; and causal principles play an important part in allocating the burden of circumstantial luck." 54 In its commentary on Article 16 on aid and assistance, for instance, the ILC speaks of "a specific causal link between that act and the conduct of the assisting, directing or coercing State". ASR Commentary, at 65 (para. 8). Arguably, the terminology of 'attribution of damage' to an actor is more typical in legal discourse than that of 'causation of conduct'. 55 The exception in this regard is Tal Becker who argues that agency, as the underlying conception of the attribution of conduct, is "merely one category of responsibility for the acts of another that is causally based" and argues that it is "possible to consider alternative responsibility regimes that need not be tied to agency conceptions". Becker, supra note 45, at 286.
outcome. 56 For purposes of responsibility, this legally proscribed outcome is typically damage. The attribution of conduct thus precedes the inquiry into causation of damage. It is only if the corporate legal person had the capacity to commit the wrongful act in question, based on control over his her own conduct (i.ie. the conduct of his or her agent), that responsibility for the outcome caused may be established. 57 In order to keep these different stages apart, it is helpful to use different terminology.
In the absence of material damage, however, it could still be argued that a causal analysis following the attribution of wrongful conduct is unnecessary. Material damage manifests itself, for instance, in the form of economic loss or physical harm. In this context, causation serves to link the wrongful conduct with the damage, which is to be addressed in terms of restitution and particularly compensation. In contrast, it is much more problematic to find an appropriate role for causation in cases of non-material damage. Such non-material damage is typically -but not exclusively -addressed by remedies such as restitution or satisfaction. Particularly declaratory judgments, declaring the breach of an international obligation as a form of satisfaction to the injured party, are quite common in international law (much more common than monetary compensation), 58 which may be related to the lack of strong international law enforcement. Causation does hardly ever explicitly figure in such an analysis, which may explain some of the lack of attention given to causal analysis in the law of international responsibility more generally. 59 Nonetheless, it is submitted here that causation has a role to play in cases of nonmaterial damage. More specifically, it underlines the distinction between wrongfulness from responsibility and shifts the analytical focus from the wrongdoer to the injured party that has suffered an injury and may seek an appropriate remedy. 61 Moreover, the causation of damage is a much more flexible concept than the attribution of wrongful conduct. The latter is essentially a binary standard: either the conduct is attributable to an actor or not. In contrast, causation of non-material and/or material damage may occur in different degrees.
Damage must be sufficient to constitute an injury, i.e. an interference with legally protected interests, but can go beyond that minimum threshold. 62 As a result, responsibility for that damage may exist in different degrees and incumbent on different or multiple wrongdoers, as expressed in different remedies that target the wrongful conduct.
Concurrent Causation of Damage by States and International Organizations
The main role of causation in the legal context is to allocate responsibility to specific actors. While causation certainly plays an important role in situations involving only one potential wrongdoer, it is particularly relevant in cases of shared responsibility, namely by assigning secondary obligations of reparation to the multiple wrongdoers. In some instances, however, the allocation of 1948) . 65 On categories of indivisible damage see Prickett, supra note 63, at 132: "There are two basic categories of indivisible injuries. First, there is the indivisible injury that is not even theoretically divisible. Examples of this type of injury are death, a single wound, and the sinking of a barge."' The second type of indivisible injury is one that is at least theoretically divisible but is single as a practical matter because the plaintiff is "not able to apportion it among the wrongdoers with reasonable certainty, as where a stream is polluted as the result of refuse from several factories. To avoid such shifting of the responsibility buck at the expense of the injured party, it is suggested here to hold one actor responsibility for the whole or at least part of the damage. Many domestic legal systems know a version of the principle of the principle of joint and several responsibility. 69 In a nutshell, this 67 See Gaja, supra note 28, at 4-5, suggesting that international organizations may have ancillary obligations of prevention when their member states commit internationally wrongful acts. 68 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the merits of different tests of causation such as the but-for test or the NESS test (necessary element for the sufficiency of a sufficient set). For a discussion see Jane Stapleton, 'Choosing What We Mean by Causation in the Law?', (2008) 73 Missouri Law Review 433-480. 69 See generally Prickett, supra note 63, at 132, stating: "There are a number of different situations in which joint and several liability has been recognized by at least some authorities. These include instances when: (1) the actors knowingly join in the performance of the tortious act or acts; (2) the actors breach a common duty owed to the plaintiff; (3) there is a special relationship between the actors (for example, master and servant or joint entrepreneurs); and (4) principle basically allows an injured party to bring a claim against any of the wrongdoers for the whole damage. In some instances, the burden of proof is then shifted to the potential wrongdoers who must show that they were not involved in the causation of the damage. 70 In this regard, it is noteworthy that the principle of joint and several responsibility protects the interests of both the injured and the responsible party. On the one hand, the injured party has the possibility to The Convention concerned was a so-called mixed agreement to which both the EU (then EC) and its members were parties. Although the ECJ's statement is considered an isolated incidence, it supports the potential usefulness of the principle of joint and several responsibility in protecting the interests of the injured party. The prospect of joint and several responsibility may actually be one of the reasons why the EU has developed a practice of attaching special 'declarations of competence' to international agreements to which both the European Union and/or its member States are parties. 77 Despite frequently changing divisions of competences within the EU, these declarations could be seen as a suitable means to externalise the internal division of competences within an international organization so that each responsible actor is only held responsible for its share of the damage.
Besides the ECJ, other domestic or international courts have never applied the principle of joint and several responsibility to international organizations. 
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In order for the principle of joint and several responsibility to be attractive to responsible parties, however, it would also be necessary to develop the second stage of the joint and several proceedings. In other words, it would be necessary to clarify the cause of action which one responsible party could use against its joint wrongdoers to claim contributions. In domestic proceedings involving joint and several responsibility, the responsible party can use the initial judgment to seek compensation from the other responsible party(ies) in separate proceedings. 
To Share or Not to Share? Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Sharing Responsibility
Although shared responsibility is an increasingly popular topic in international legal scholarship and political rhetoric, the contribution has shown that the law of international responsibility is still very much geared towards exclusive responsibility. International responsibility is based on the two elements of the internationally wrongful act, the attribution of conduct and the breach of an international obligation. Obligations are necessarily owed independently; they prescribe standards of conduct to be complied with by autonomous legal persons.
While legal personality is attributed externally, whether by the international legal system or member states, the attribution of conduct to an international organization subsequently serves to underline the effectiveness of that corporate legal personality. As corporate legal persons, states and international organizations necessarily depend on natural persons or other entities as their agents. It is the attribution of conduct to a corporate legal person -and not to its individual agents -that makes clear that the corporate entity has autonomous legal personality, i.e. the capacity to have rights and obligations.
As autonomous legal persons, states and international organizations commit internationally wrongful acts by breaching these obligations. Considering that these obligations are owed independently, it is not surprising that the result is exclusive responsibility. After having established that a state or international organization breached its international obligation, the inquiry focuses on its particular duty to repair the damage caused. Indeed, exclusive responsibility is not without benefits. In fact, both responsible and injured persons arguably have an interest in exclusive responsibility. Their participation in responsibility mechanisms may serve as proof of the effectiveness of their international legal personality. This argument is particularly important for international organizations, which do not have a territory or other means to manifest their more concrete means to manifest their autonomous existence. In addition, both injured parties and responsible parties equally have an interest in exclusive responsibility that can be clearly allocated to one actor. The former because they do not want to be held responsible for damage that they have not caused; and the latter because they seek an effective remedy that can best be provided by the actual responsible party. 84 Nonetheless, the focus on exclusive responsibility in the law of international responsibility stems from a time in which international relations were much less complex, with states being the only subjects of international law. The number of subjects of international law has increased and so has the number of potential injured parties of internationally wrongful acts by states and international organizations. 85 In today's interdependent world, situations of shared responsibility are much more likely to occur. In this context, it was suggested that shared responsibility is not defined by the "same internationally wrongful act" but by the "same damage". More precisely, shared responsibility results when different internationally wrongful acts contribute to the same damage.
However, shared responsibility does not mean that it is not possible to allocate responsibility. Even in cases of shared responsibility, it is often still possible to allocate responsibility to different actors on the basis of causation or other allocation principles.
Only in cases of shared responsibility strictu sensu is it not possible to attribute responsibility to individual wrongdoers. Such shared responsibility strictu sensu is characterized by so-called indivisible damage that is concurrently caused by several wrongdoers but resistant to any kind of logical subdivision. Seen from this angle, shared responsibility may have more costs than benefits for injured and responsible parties. In a situation of indivisible damage, it might be quite costly -not to say impossible -for the injured party to seek to establish who is responsible for the damage. Legal proceedings may have an uncertain outcome as illustrated by the Behrami and Saramati case. In contrast, the responsible party may somewhat benefit from a situation of shared responsibility if it succeeds to shift the buck of responsibility to other co-responsible parties.
However, by not participating in remedial mechanisms, states and especially 84 For a discussion of this point see Pieter Jan Kuijper, 'Attribution -Responsibility -Remedy. Some Comments on the EU in Different International Regimes', (2013) Revue belge de droit international [forthcoming] . 85 On the diversification of persons that may be responsible see Pellet, supra note 25, at 6-7. See also Nollkaemper and Jacobs, supra note 1, at 374.
international organizations may miss an important opportunity to assert their legal personality. Moreover, they also face the risk of an uncertain outcome of judicial proceedings, even if they are not parties to those proceedings like the UN in the Behrami and Saramati case. For the responsible party, the costs of shared responsibility might therefore equally outweigh its benefits.
In order to reduce the costs of shared responsibility strictu sensu for injured and responsible parties, it was suggested here to give more prominence to the principle of joint and several responsibility, which offers one way to handle the uncertain allocation of responsibility accompanying indivisible damage. While indivisible damage classically occurs as a result of simultaneous wrongful acts, it was argued that the impermeability of the corporate veil of international organizations could justify the application of joint and several responsibility to states and international organizations. Accordingly the injured party could sue either of the joint wrongdoers, the international organization or its member states, for the whole or at least part of the damage. In such a situation, it could be argued that the burden of proving non-involvement in the causation of the indivisible damage should shift to the responsible party(ies). The principle of joint and several responsibility would thus provide more remedial avenues, allowing for claims against either the international organization or its member states, and also improve the position of injured parties in the judicial proceedings.
And yet, it must be acknowledged that the full adoption of the principle of joint and several responsibility faces considerable challenges in the decentralized international legal system. In particular, it remains an open question on which legal basis the sued wrongdoer could hold the other wrongdoers responsible. As discussed above, the practice of international organizations such as the UN or the EU might point to the possibility that the decisions of domestic courts and international tribunals could provide for a cause of action to seek contributions from co-responsible parties. From the point of view of a cost-benefit analysis, the second stage in the joint and several proceedings is conducive to protecting the interests of the joint wrongdoers. Considering that any of the joint wrongdoers faces the risk of being held responsible individually for the whole damage or part of it, the possibility to hold the other wrongdoers subsequently 28 responsible for their individual contributions would reduce the costs of shared responsibility for the co-responsible actors. In the ideal case, the principle of joint and several responsibility would thus allow for an allocation responsibility similar to that in the scenario of exclusive responsibility, including the abovediscussed benefits of holding an actor responsible individually. Instead of speaking of exclusive responsibility, however, it is suggested to speak of independent responsibility of states and international organizations as determined by means of the principle of joint and several responsibility.
